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Recent Cases
CoNTRAcrs-PLACE WHmE MADE, WhEN AccEPTANCE Is By TErapioN

-Plaintiff insurance brokers in Pennsylvania offered by telephone to
place with defendant insurance company in New York contracts for
reinsurance of certain risks undertaken by another insurance company. Defendant accepted the oral offer by telephone. When plaintiff alleged a breach of the contract in an action to recover certain
commissions, defendant contended that the statute of frauds of the
State of New York, from where the acceptance was allegedly spoken,
barred any action. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Held:
reversed. Where one accepts an offer by telephone, the contract is
formed at the place where the acceptor speaks. Record remanded to
determine the state where the acceptor spoke. Linn v. Employers
Reinsurance Corporation,139 A.2d 638, 392 Pa. 58 (1958).
This relatively simple holding presents a most provoking problem
in the law of contracts, for a logical consequence of the modem objective theory as to the formation of bilateral contracts would seem to
require that the manifestation of acceptance be communicated to the
offeror.' Authorities are willing to concede that the posting of a
letter of acceptance and the delivery of a telegram of acceptance to
the telegraph company are sufficient acts to form a contract despite
the lack of communication, but there is some doubt in regard to
speaking an acceptance over the telephone. Professor Williston and
the Restatement of Contracts are the leading proponents of the rule
that a telephone acceptance should be the same as where two parties
speak face to face. In other words, the offeror must hear the acceptance before a contract is formed. 2
In order to evaluate the rule of the Linn case, which treats the
acceptance of effective when spoken, it is necessary to view the holding as involving a twofold problem of place and time. The accepted
conflict of laws rule is that "the law of the place of contracting determines whether a promise is void, or voidable for fraud, duress,
illegality or mistake or other legal or equitable defense."3 The place
of contracting is in turn dependent upon the place of acceptance since
acceptance is the act which completes the formation of a contract.
1

However Williston points out in § 70 that communication of the acceptance
in a bilateral contract may be dispensed with by the offeror. Williston, Contracts
§ 70 2 (1929).
Restatement, Contracts § 65 (1932). 1 Williston, Contracts § 82 (1929).
3 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 847 (1934). See also Scudder v. Union
National Bank, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 406 (1875); Dacosta v. Hatch, 4 Zab. 819 (N.J.,
1854).
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Since the place of acceptance determines the law which controls
contract formation, it becomes important to consider the justiflication, if any, for treating the acceptance as occurring when the words
of acceptance are spoken. The usual reasoning in support of this
position is drawn from an analogy to the time of contracting applicable in the mailing of a letter.4 To understand the significance of this
analogy it is necessary to realize the conditions under which the
historic Adams v. Lindsel85 case was decided which established the
principle that the posting of a letter of acceptance formed a contract. As Professor Grismore points out, the subjective theory of
mutual assent was prevalent at the time of the decision, and it was
doubtful at that time whether an offer could create a continuing power
of acceptance in the offeree. The courts realized, however, that unless a compromise was made there could be no consummation of
contracts by correspondence. Hence, the courts were willing to hold
"that the proposal would be operative until the offeree had an opportunity to manifest his acceptance by an unequivocal overt act,
but no longer."6 The posting of a letter of acceptance was considered
such an act, and furthermore, it was7 not deemed essential that the
overt act be made to the other party.
Despite the fact that the rule concerning posting is not necessary under the objective theory, and indeed conflicts with the requirements of communication under it, courts have followed the
Adams case and show no substantial tendency to change the principle of that case. Furthermore, the reason given in modem cases for
upholding the Adams case, which centers around the authority granted
to the offeree to communicate his acceptance by mail,8 affords an
excellent basis for extending its application to means of communication other than mail. As formulated by the Restatement of Contracts:
An acceptance is authorized to be sent by the means used by the
offeror or customary in similar transactions at the time when and the
place where the offer is received, unless the terms of the offer or
surrounding circumstances known to the offeree otherwise indicate. 9

In light of this development, it is not difficult to see why the principle has spread to contracts made by the telegraph 0 and telephone,"
4

Bank of Yolo v. Sperry Flour Co., 141 Cal. 814, 74 Pac. 855 (1903);

Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Mills, 293 Ky. 463, 169 S.W.2d 311 (1943).

5 1 B. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
6 Grismore, Contracts § 48 at 70 (1947).
7Id. §48.
8 1 Williston, Contracts § 83 (1929).
9 Restatement, Contracts § 66 (1932).
10

(1932).

Cowan v. O'Connor, [1888] 2 Q.B. 640; Restatement, Contracts § 64

11 Bank of Yolo v. Sperry Flour Co., supra note 4; Trinity Universal Ins. Co.
v. Mills, supra note 4.
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as well as by mail. To find fault with these extensions of the principle
is to find fault with the principle itself, and even Williston admits
that the law is so well settled on the rule of the Adams case as to
make discussion "academic."1 2 It is to be admitted that the passing of
a postal regulation 13 allowing the sender to reclaim a letter before it
is delivered has caused a few courts to hold receipt of a letter of acceptance is necessary to bind a contract, 1 4 but this regulation has nothing to do with the holding in the Adams case which was based on
the manifestation of an overt act of acceptance and not on the control of the letter. It is also to be admitted that England has held an acceptance on a telex machine is effective to create a contract when
received on the basis of its being instantaneous. 15 While no court
in the United States has had occasion to decide on this particular mode
of communication, if the need should arise, the court would be disregarding all need for uniformity in commercial transactions by
following the English rule. These relatively few decisions should not
be the basis for overruling our progress toward a uniform system.
The court in the principle case has expressed the need for uniformity in all modes of communication. The importance of the need
can easily be seen when one considers the confusion which could
arise where two companies in the same state accept separate offers from out of state, one using the telephone and the other the
telex as modes of communication. The former company would be
governed by the laws of its own state, whereas the latter company
would be subjected to the state laws of the offeror under the English
rule. A situation such as this creates confusion in the application of
the conflict of laws rule which provides that validity of a contract is
a matter to be governed by the state where the contract is made. Obviously, both acceptances originated in the same place-just as if a
letter of acceptance had been posted.
The doctrine of the Linn case does not prevent the parties from
controlling the time of acceptance to suit their own needs. The offeror has the privilege of requiring the receipt of an acceptance for
the contract to be binding. 16 Surely it is no great burden on the offeror
to make this stipulation a part of the offer and thus remove all doubts.Y7
One making an offer by telephone could easily state that it is his
practice to make all contracts subject to his own state laws.
1 Williston, Contracts § 81 (1929).
U.S. Post Office Regulation § 552-53 (1913).
14 Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. C1. 1955);

12
13

Dick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949).

15 Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp. [1955] 2 All E.R. 493 (A.C.).
16
17

Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, [1879] 4 Ex. D. 216, 223.
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 826 (1934).
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One should by all means realize that not all aspects of contracts
made by telephone are governed by the law of the place where the
acceptance is spoken. The courts have consistently held that if the
question concerns the performance of the contract, then the laws
of the place of performance are applicable,." which is in accord with
the conflict of laws rule.
The writer believes the principle case stands for the correct rule
to be applied as to contract formation. It is significant that only a
month after the Linn case was decided, the same question arose in
California, and the identical principle was once again affirmed. 19
Kentucky has also gone along with the majority in accepting this
principle. 20 Since the Adams case is such an established authority, it
is only reasonable for all other modes of communication to be treated
consistently with this historic precedent if we are to achieve a uniform
system.
William M. Dishman, Jr.

AuTroMoBmEs-FAmLY PulnoSE Docr NE-CoNsENT OF OwNlmi-A
twenty-year old son asked his mother for permission to use the familyowned car which was registered in her name. She refused permission
because she might need the car in order to visit her doctor. The son
took the car anyway and a friend went with him. After eating dinner
at the friend's house, they were "riding around" later in the afternoon
when an accident occurred. There was testimony by persons living
in the community that the son was frequently seen driving the car.
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that defendant mother was
liable under the Family Purpose Doctrine for the negligence of her
son even though he was operating the family car without permission.
She appealed, claiming that consent to the use of the car is an essential element of the Family Purpose Doctrine. Held: affirmed. The
court reasoned that where a family automobile is customarily available
for use by a child for his normal pursuits on reasonably frequent ocI8 Cardon v. Hampton, 21 Ala. App. 438, 109 So. 176 (1926); Bank of Yolo
v. Sperry Flour Co., supra note 4; see Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 858 (1934)

which provides that:

The duty for the performance of which a party to contract is bound
will be discharged by compliance with the law of the place of per-

formance of the promise with respect to:
a. The manner of performance;
b. The time and locality of performance;
c. The person or persons by whom or to whom performance shall
be rendered;
d. The sufficiency of performance;

e. Excuse for non-performance.
19
2 Wilson v. Scannavino, 324 Pac.2d 350 (Cal. 1958).
0 Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Mills, supra note 4.

